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PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY INACTION UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
AND HECKLER v. CHANEY: CENTER FOR
AUTO SAFETY v. DOLE
Judicial review of an administrative agency's action has served
as an important safeguard against possible abuses of administra-
tive power.1 The common law developed a presumption of review-
ability of affirmative agency action which was codified into the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA").2 To this general mandate,
See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.1 (2d ed. 1984). Although a useful working
definition of an administrative agency is difficult, see 1 K DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 1:2 (2d ed. 1978); G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 21
(1974), the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), defines it as "each
authority of the Government of the United States ... but does not include ... (A) the
Congress; (B) the courts of the United States." Id. § 551(1). In our tripartite scheme of
government, administrative agencies are a part of the executive branch with legislative and
adjudicatory powers, although only to the extent permitted by the statutes creating them.
See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-5 (4th ed.
1976); B. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 1.6, at 10-11.
The basic remedy available to a party aggrieved by an agency decision is judicial review.
See B. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 8.1; see also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 308-09 (1944) (Con-
gress has circumscribed the power of agencies through judicial review); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (legislative powers broadly delegated to
agencies due to availability of judicial review), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHL L. REV. 653, 655 (1985)
(availability of judicial review increases likelihood that regulatory discretion will be reasona-
bly exercised). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-27
(1965) (judicial review as necessary condition if administrative system is to maintain
legitimacy).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The intent to grant to the courts the
power of review was reflected in the legislative history. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967) ("'[t]o preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not
specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of
an intent to withhold it' ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946));
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 653-54 (presumption of reviewability derived from legislative his-
tory and need to insure regulatory process will be fairly exercised).
The most important aspect of the APA is the recognition of an individual's right to seek
judicial review. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140-41. Section 702 of the APA pro-
vides in pertinent part: "A person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute.., is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. §
702 (Supp. IV 1986).
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the APA provides exceptions where the substantive "statutes pre-
clude judicial review"3 and where "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."' 4 As to an agency's decision not to act,
however, the Supreme Court expressly enunciated a presumption
of unreviewability in Heckler v. Chaney." Nonetheless, in Center
Under common law, the presumption originally was one of unreviewability of adminis-
trative decisions. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516-17 (1840); see also
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31-32 (1827) (recognizing the executive as "sole and
exclusive judge" when statute provided discretionary power). In 1902, however, the Supreme
Court held that a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General was judicially reviewable.
See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1902). There-
after, there has been a presumption of reviewability. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S.
at 140-41 (expressly establishing presumption of reviewability and holding drug manufac-
turers could seek judicial review of FDA rulings); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947) (removal order under the Banking Act of 1933 re-
viewable). See also 5 K. DAvIs, supra note 1, § 28:1, at 253-55 (discussion of development of
presumption of reviewability).
3 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982). The application of section 701(a)(1) requires an initial
interpretation of the underlying substantive statute to determine the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review in certain instances. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text;
see generally 2 C. KoCH, ADMimisTRATIVE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 8.1 (1985) (discussion of pro-
visions of APA).
4 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review when the sub-
stantive statute is drawn without providing a court with a meaningful standard by which to
measure the validity of an agency's decision. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text. Professor Davis
has emphasized that the law of reviewability has not been changed by the APA because
operation of section 701(a) depends on the underlying "statute" or "law." See 5 K. DAVIs,
supra note 1, § 28:1, at 256-57. The inquiry to determine the extent to which a statute
precludes review, and the extent to which agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law, is the same as it would be under the common law. See id.
5 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Chaney involved prison inmates who requested that the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") act to prevent the use of various drugs for capital
punishment purposes. Id. at 823. Claiming lack of jurisdiction, the FDA refused to act, not-
ing that even if it had jurisdiction, it had "inherent discretion" not to initiate enforcement
proceedings unless there was either an extreme danger to the public or a scheme to defraud.
Id. at 824-25. The Court declared that there was a presumption of unreviewability of an
agency's refusal to take enforcement steps under APA section 701(a)(2). See id. at 831. The
Court reasoned that: (1) an agency's decision not to act involves a balancing of various ele-
ments within its expertise; (2) an agency's coercive power is not exercised when it refuses to
act; thus, an individual's liberty or property rights are not infringed upon; (3) inaction, un-
like affirmative action, does not provide a focus for judicial review; and (4) an agency's inac-
tion is similar to a prosecutor's discretion not to indict which has been regarded immune
from judicial review. Id. at 831-32.
The settled rule of prosecutorial discretion has immunized criminal prosecutors from
judicial scrutiny of their decisions not to initiate investigations. See, e.g., United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (decision whether to prosecute generally lies in prose-
cutor's discretion); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380
(2d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor's decision not to investigate not subject to judicial intervention in
absence of statutorily defined standards of reviewability). In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
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for Auto Safety v. Dole,6 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an administrative agency's denial of a
petition to reopen an investigation was subject to judicial review,
concluding that the agency's internal regulations provided a judi-
cially manageable standard.7
In Center for Auto Safety, the Center for Auto Safety
("CAS"), pursuant to section 1410a of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Act"),8 petitioned the National High-
way Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA") to reopen
an enforcement investigation alleging a parking mechanism defect
in automatic transmissions built by the Ford Motor Company.9 In
1976, the NHTSA had conducted such an investigation, which re-
560 (1975), however, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor's decision not to
bring a civil action to set aside a union election was reviewable, but provided no guidelines
other than the conclusion that the relevant statute did not preclude review. Id. at 568. The
Court summarily disposed of the issue of prosecutorial discretion by noting that the Secre-
tary's contention that his decision was unreviewable was without merit. See id. at 567 n.7.
8 828 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 801.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1410a (a)-(c) (1982). The Act provides that "[a]ny interested person
may file with the Secretary a petition requesting him ... to commence a proceeding to
determine whether to issue an order pursuant to section 1412(b) of this title." Id. §
1410a(a). However, subsection (c) grants the agency broad discretion by empowering "[lt]he
Secretary... [to] conduct such investigation or proceeding as he deems appropriate in order
to determine whether or not such petition should be granted." Id. § 1410a(c). The only
obligation imposed on the Secretary is provided in subsection (d): "Within 120 days after
filing of a petition . . . the Secretary shall either grant or deny the petition .... If the
Secretary denies such petition he shall publish in the Federal Register his reasons for such
denial." Id. § 1410a(d).
The Act provides two stages of investigation and enunciates the remedies available to a
successful petitioner:
(a)If through testing, inspection, investigation .... the Secretary determines that
any motor vehicle.
(2) contains a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety;
he shall immediately notify the manufacturer .... and shall publish notice of such
determination in the Federal Register.... The Secretary shall afford such manu-
facturer an opportunity to present data, views, and arguments to establish that
there is no defect... ; and shall afford other interested persons an opportunity to
present data, views, and arguments respecting the determination of the Secretary.
(b)f, after such presentations by the manufacturer and interested persons, the
Secretary determines that such vehicle ... contains a defect ... , the Secretary
shall order the manufacturer (1) to furnish notification respecting such vehicle...
to owners .... and (2) to remedy such defect ....
Id. § 1412. The Secretary has delegated authority to the Administrator of the NHTSA to
carry out the provisions of the Act. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1987). Therefore, throughout
this Comment, the NHTSA is referred to as the agency empowered under the Act.
9 Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 802.
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sulted in a settlement agreement that required Ford to notify own-
ers of the possible defect.10 The CAS brought an action seeking to
enjoin the settlement and to compel a recall, but it was unsuccess-
ful."" Although the CAS subsequently claimed to have additional
evidence, the NHTSA, after reviewing the new evidence along with
other available information, denied the petition to reopen the in-
vestigation. 2 Consequently, the CAS brought the instant action
challenging the NHTSA's denial as "arbitrary and capricious."'"
The district court upheld the agency's denial, holding that the
NHTSA's decision not to investigate was not open to judicial re-
view due to the presumption of unreviewability,"' and that even if
it had been reviewable, the scope of review would have been lim-
ited to the reasons stated by the agency for its decision.15 On ap-
peal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court on both grounds. 6
Chief Judge Wald, writing for the court, reasoned that the Act
did not preclude judicial review of the agency's decision not to in-
vestigate 7 and that while the NHTSA's decision was discretionary,
its own regulations provided the court with the "law to apply,"
10 See Center for Auto Safety v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Lewis, the
NHTSA granted the petition and conducted an investigation which lasted over two and one-
half years and involved twenty-three million vehicles. Id. at 659. The investigation produced
over 382 cubic feet of documents including accident reports, blue prints, and engineering
evaluations of other types of transmissions. Id. at 660. After the investigation, the NHTSA
made an "initial determination" that a safety defect existed under 15 U.S.C. § 1412. Id. The
NHTSA, in deciding to settle with Ford instead of making a final determination, gave the
following reasons: (1) a final determination of defect was not likely and, in any event, "ma-
jor new investigative efforts" would have been necessary; (2) even if the defect were finally
determined, enforcement would have been difficult because Ford would have challenged any
such order, postponing any potential recovery; and (3) NHTSA resources were being
drained by the investigation. Id. at 663. However, the NHTSA specifically reserved the right
to take further actions if warranted by additional facts. Id. at 661 n.5.
1' See id. at 657. The Lewis court unanimously upheld the settlement agreement, hold-
ing that the NHTSA had not acted arbitrarily. Id.
12 Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 802.
1 See id. The remedy for an "arbitrary and capricious" agency action is provided by
the APA: "The reviewing court shall- ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The APA also grants
the reviewing court a broad scope of review by stating that the "court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party." Id. § 706.
" Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 801.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 804; infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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thereby rebutting the presumption against judicial review.' s The
court also held that the scope of review should go beyond the
agency's official statement of reasons and extend to the compiled
record upon which the agency based its decision. 9
In a strong dissent, Judge Bork argued there was "clear and
convincing" evidence that the Act precluded judicial review of
NHTSA inaction,20 and that the agency's internal regulations
could not create a right to judicial review contrary to congressional
intent.2' Alternatively, Judge Bork argued, the Chaney presump-
tion of unreviewability should control to preclude review.22 On the
issue of the scope of review, Judge Bork argued that the reviewing
court was restricted to the agency's statement of reasons.2
It is suggested that the court in Center for Auto Safety had to
overcome three hurdles to conclude that judicial review was availa-
ble: two exceptions of APA section 701(a) and the Chaney pre-
sumption of unreviewability. It is submitted that the court's deci-
sion was erroneous because a balanced construction of the Act
demonstrates congressional intent to preclude judicial review in
the case of a NHTSA decision not to open a defect investigation.
Furthermore, the regulations on which the court relied do not pro-
vide judicially manageable standards because they are merely pro-
8 Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 803; infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
19 Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 801. Generally, the scope of permissible judicial
review over administrative decisions ranges from absolute deference to de novo review. See
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSs, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 349 (8th ed. 1987).
In Center for Auto Safety, the court distinguished Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975), and followed Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985). See 828 F.2d
at 809-15. In Dunlop, the Supreme Court limited judicial review to the Secretary of Labor's
official statement of reasons for not bringing a civil action to set aside a union election. 421
U.S. at 572-74. The Court refused to extend its investigation to the administrative record in
order to shield the elective process from lengthy and disruptive litigation. Id. at 573. How-
ever, in the absence of special considerations such as the need for swift resolution, the
Center for Auto Safety court deemed the administrative record open to review by recogniz-
ing a nexus between the potential safety hazard of faulty design in nuclear reactors, which
Lorion addressed, and the alleged transmission defects in the instant case. 828 F.2d at 814-
15.
20 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 816-18 (Bork, J., dissenting).
21 See id. at 819 (Bork, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 819-20 (Bork, J., dissenting).
23 See id. at 820-26 (Bork, J., dissenting). Judge Bork argued that the instant case was
more compelling than Dunlop because the Act provided the NHTSA with even more discre-
tion than that given to the Secretary of Labor in Dunlop, thereby requiring the reviewing
court to restrict the scope of review to the reasons stated by the NHTSA. See id. at 820,
821-25 (Bork, J., dissenting).
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cedural guidelines for the agency. Finally, this Comment will sug-
gest that by examining congressional intent, the Chaney
presumption should be overcome in its own right, not merely as a
part of the "law to apply" test.
STATUTORY PRECLUSION UNDER SECTION 701(a)(1)
Although the APA's general presumption is one of reviewabil-
ity, section 701(a)(1) provides an exception when the statutes
under which the agency operates preclude judicial review.2 4 Where
there is no express provision foreclosing judicial review, section
701(a)(1) will nonetheless apply if congressional intent of preclu-
sion can be shown by "clear and convincing" evidence 25 or is
"fairly discernible."26 Application of these standards requires the
courts to examine not only the express language of the statute but
also its structure, objectives, legislative history, and the nature of
the agency action involved.
The majority in Center for Auto Safety impliedly conceded
that the language of the Act grants very broad, if not absolute,
discretion to the Secretary without subjecting him to any legal
standard.28 Furthermore, the Act's structure explicitly provides ju-
24 See supra note 3.
26 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) ("[o]nly upon a showing of 'clear
and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review") (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)); see
also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (applying
Abbott Laboratories test and finding no "showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' ").
A similar standard of "persuasive reason" has been derived from Abbott Laboratories
and is often cited. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 670 (1986) ("judicial review ... by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there
is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress") (quoting Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977) (same).
26 See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984) (presumption of
reviewability overcome when congressional intent of preclusion is "fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme") (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 157 (1970)). The "fairly discernible" standard is less stringent than the "clear and con-
vincing" standard and the Court used it to explain that the "clear and convincing" standard
was never meant in the strict evidentiary sense. See id. at 350-51.
217 See id. at 345; see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S.
444, 454-63 (1979) (language, structure, and legislative history of Interstate Commerce Act
implied preclusion of judicial review of ICC's decision not to investigate shipping rate in-
crease). See generally Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 1976 DuKE L.J. 431, 442-49 (discussion of elements to be examined in
ascertaining congressional intent to preclude judicial review under section 701(a)(1)).
28 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 806-08. The Secretary "may" conduct an
investigation as "he" deems appropriate. See 15 U.S.C. § 1410a(c) (1982).
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dicial review29 and appropriate remedies 0 at various stages of re-
view but not at the stage of petition denial. The Act's basic objec-
tive of safety is not controverted; however, it is submitted that
Congress intended this objective to be effectuated through agency
discretion and expertise. Congressional intent to preclude review is
also illustrated by the removal of an express provision for judicial
review over petition denials in what became the 1974 amend-
ment."1 Lastly, it is significant that the administrative decision in-
volved inaction, not an exercise of affirmative power.3 2
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 1394 (1982) (establishing jurisdiction and judicial review over valid-
ity of orders establishing safety standards); id. § 1399(a) (granting the district courts juris-
diction over enforcement actions by the Secretary against motor vehicle manufacturers).
3o See id. § 1399(a) (injunctive relief to restrain sale of defective automobiles); id. §
1400(b) (civil action by a dealer to recover damages plus costs incurred due to sale of non-
conforming vehicle); see also id. § 1398 (imposition of civil penalties upon violation of sec-
tion 1397).
31 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 817-18 (Bork, J., dissenting). The original
bill had the following provision under the section on "Agency Responsibility":
(a)(e)(1) If the Secretary denies the petition .... the petitioner may commence a
civil action in a United States district court to compel the Secretary to commence
or complete the proceeding (or both) ....
(2) If the petitioner can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court, by
preponderance of the evidence in a de novo proceeding before such court, that the
motor vehicle ... contains a ... defect which relates to motor vehicle safety...
and that the failure of the Secretary to commence or complete the proceeding as
requested in the petition unreasonably exposes the petitioner or other consumers
to a risk of injury ... ,the court shall order the Secretary to commence or com-
plete the proceeding ....
H.R. 5529, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1973). This provision was deleted by the House Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Representative Eckhardt, one of the original
sponsors, objected and stated that he would offer an amendment to avail the civil actions,
see 120 CONG. REc. 27,807-08 (1974), but he never did so. See Center for Auto Safety, 828
F.2d at 818 (Bork, J., dissenting).
The Center for Auto Safety court distinguished between the normal APA scope of re-
view and the bill's de novo review which would permit independent judicial determination,
and concluded that Congress intended merely to delete the de novo review, not to com-
pletely eliminate the availability of review. See 828 F.2d at 804-05. It is submitted, however,
that Congress could have expressed that intent by simply deleting the phrase containing "de
novo proceeding." See 828 F.2d at 818 (Bork, J., dissenting) (citing letter from House Com-
mittee Chairman who approved such deletion).
The strongest evidence in the legislative history supporting the court's interpretation is
a Conference Report statement that the conferees decided to leave to the courts the ques-
tion of availability of pre-enforcement review. See id. at 806-07; HR. CON. REP. No. 1452,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6084, 6095. How-
ever, this passage concerns review of suits by manufacturers objecting to enforcement of
defect remedies and does not apply to the relevant section, entitled "Agency Responsibil-
ity," which governs citizen petitions under section 1410a. See id. at 6106.
312 See supra note 5. It is suggested that the four reasons noted by the Court in Chaney
to support the presumption of unreviewability under section 701(a)(2) may well be consid-
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It is submitted that these five elements should be examined as
a whole to determine whether it is "fairly discernible in the statu-
tory scheme" that Congress intended to foreclose review. The
Center for Auto Safety court failed to consider all of these ele-
ments and, from those it did examine, concluded that each partic-
ular element did not by itself provide "clear and convincing" evi-
dence without being weighed cumulatively."3
AGENCY DISCRETION PRECLUSION UNDER SECTION 701(a)(2)
The precise meaning of section 701(a)(2) has been a trouble-
some issue for the courts." The Supreme Court in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe3 5 applied this exception to stat-
utes "'drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply.' "36 The Center for Auto Safety court acknowledged
ered in the balancing process under section 701(a)(1).
33 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 804-09.
" Compare 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982) (some actions within agency discretion are not
reviewable) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) ("reviewing" courts determine existence of
"abuse of discretion"). It is suggested that there is some contradiction between the two
sections because a court cannot determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion
without reviewing the decision. An example of this tension is illustrated by WWHT, Inc. v.
FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which presented a question as to whether the FCC's
denial of a petition for rulemaking was reviewable. Id. at 809. The court stated:
Except where there is evidence of a 'clear and convincing legislative intent to ne-
gate review,'.., agency denials of petitions for rulemaking may be made the sub-
ject of judicial review. We have no doubt that, except in the rarest of cases, the
decision to institute rulemaking is one that is largely committed to agency discre-
tion; however, this begs the question with respect to judicial review.
Id. at 815; see also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
("while review is not granted for action 'by law committed to agency discretion,'.., review
is expressly provided for when there is an abuse of that discretion").
35 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
31 Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). Since Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, section 701(a)(2) has been known as the "no law to apply" excep-
tion. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 445 (1979)
(citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park approvingly). Professor Davis has criticized the
"no law to apply" standard as dictum which contradicts the true congressional intent. See 5
K. DAvis, supra note 1, § 28:8, at 290-93. However, the idea has been widely accepted by the
courts and the search has become whether the "law to apply" was present or not in a given
case. See, e.g., Arizona Power Auth. v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir.) ("no law to
apply" to Secretary of Interior's decision of marketing criteria), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835
(1977); Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44, 46-48 (D. Colo. 1985) (searching for "law to
apply" in Wilderness Act).
Some courts have departed from the rigid "no law to apply" standard, indicating that
judicial competence, as urged by Professor Davis, is the appropriate standard. See, e.g., Cit-
ies of Carlisle and Neola, Iowa v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1259, 1262
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (while recognizing "no law to apply" test, court undermined it by stating
19881
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that the Act conferred broad discretion on the agency and that it
did not provide the "law to apply.""7 However, the court discerned
the "law to apply" from the NHTSA regulations.38 Dissenting,
Judge Bork concluded that the statute precluded review and that
the agency's regulations were subordinate to the substantive
statute. 9
The court's analysis of this issue rested on the regulatory stan-
dard of whether there was a "reasonable possibility" of the exis-
tence of a safety-related defect.40 However, the exact language pro-
vided by the regulations states that a petition would be granted if
there was a "reasonable possibility that the order requested in the
petition will be issued at the conclusion of the appropriate pro-
ceeding. ' 41 It is submitted that these are two different standards;
that "[tihe absence of standards by which to evaluate agency action militates strongly
against judicial review"); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[i]n practice, the determination ... turns on pragmatic considera-
tions as to whether an agency determination is the proper subject of judicial review").
A balancing approach proposed by one commentator is soundly based and should be
considered in determining whether review should be denied for action committed to agency
discretion. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367, 379 (1968). Saferstein identified nine factors to be
considered: (1) broad agency discretion; (2) expertise and experience required to understand
subject matter of agency action; (3) managerial nature of agency; (4) impropriety of judicial
intervention; (5) necessity of informal agency decision making; (6) inability of reviewing
court to ensure correct result; (7) need for expeditious operation of congressional programs;
(8) quantity of potentially appealable agency actions; and (9) existence of other methods of
preventing abuse of discretion. Id. at 380-95. See also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d
506, 512 (1st Cir. 1979) (testing principles applicable in determining judicial review).
'7 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 801.
3S See id. at 801, 803.
11 See id. at 819 (Bork, J., dissenting). Judge Bork argued that since there was a strong
congressional intent to preclude review, the agency's own rules could not defeat this intent.
See id. (Bork, J., dissenting); see also Harrison v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1505, 1517 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("an agency cannot create through its implementing regulations a right of review
withheld by the underlying statute").
0 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 800-02 (construing 49 C.F.R. § 552.8 (1987)).
1' 49 C.F.R. § 552.8 (1987). Section 552.8 provides, in pertinent part, that "at the con-
clusion of the technical review, the Administrator ... determines whether there is a reasona-
ble possibility that the order requested... will be issued .... If such a reasonable possibil-
ity is found, the petition is granted. If it is not found, the petition is denied." Id.
The NHTSA promulgated the regulations of section 552 to "establish[] procedures for
the submission and disposition of petitions ... to initiate rulemaking or to make a determi-
nation that a motor vehicle... contains a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety." Id.
§ 552.1. After a petition is filed, see id. § 552.4, an Associate Administrator is to conduct a
technical review "to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the requested
order will be issued at the conclusion of the appropriate proceeding." Id. § 552.6. He may
hold a public meeting if he decides it "would contribute to the determination whether to
commence a proceeding." Id. § 552.7.
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the former is an objective test of fact-finding whereas the latter is
an indication of discretion granted by the Act to the agency.
42
Whether there was a reasonable possibility of the issuance of
the requested order pursuant to section 1412(b) of the Act was an-
swered in the negative by the NHTSA in Center for Auto Safety,
Inc. v. Lewis. 43 The Lewis court upheld such discretion even when
the NHTSA made an initial determination that a safety-related
defect existed. 44 Center for Auto Safety presented a less compel-
ling case than Lewis because the CAS was seeking judicial review
of the agency's discretion prior to the commencement of the inves-
tigation45 and involved a matter which the agency reserved its ex-
clusive right to pursue further if additional evidence was re-
vealed.46 It is submitted that the fact that a lengthy investigation
was previously conducted and that the agency's prior decision not
to further pursue it was approved by the Lewis court buttresses
the conclusion that the agency's regulations provided only guide-
lines for the exercise of the agency's discretion. 7
42 See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 21,487 (1975) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 552 (1987)) (proposed
May 10, 1975). The NHTSA published a notice proposing the regulations which stated that
"the Administrator... would decide whether there is a reasonable possibility of positive
action, and grant or deny the petition accordingly." Id. After receiving comments from vari-
ous interested groups, the NHTSA decided to make "no substantial changes from the pro-
posal." 40 Fed. Reg. 42,013 (1975).
The Center for Auto Safety court noted that the NHTSA stated that the "reasonable
possibility" standard "limits the discretion of the Administration" in two directions: the
petition shall not be granted if a "reasonable possibility" is lacking, but must be granted if a
"reasonable possibility" exists. See 828 F.2d at 801-02 n.4. However, this statement was in
response to General Motors' argument that the NHTSA would have to grant virtually all
petitions under the "reasonable possibility" standard. See 40 Fed. Reg. 42,013 (1975). The
NHTSA disagreed and stated that "[t]he use of the modifier 'reasonable' limits the discre-
tion of the Administrator to grant only a petition for an order or rule that has a reasonable
chance of being issued, not a petition for any order or rule that may conceivably be issued."
Id. It is submitted that such a statement was not necessary if the standard which the
NHTSA had in mind was an objective and factual test of the "reasonable possibility" of a
safety defect.
43 685 F.2d 656, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Lewis court approved the NHTSA's ra-
tionale that the improbability that the requested order would be issued was a legitimate
exercise of the agency's discretion not to make a final determination. See id.; see also supra
note 10 (discussing NHTSA investigation undertaken in Lewis).
" See Lewis, 685 F.2d at 662-63.
"See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 802. It is also significant that the CAS was
challenging the NHTSA's decision as "arbitrary and capricious" without a more definite
showing of special risks. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 682-83 (allegation of generalized
arbitrariness presents weakest claim for reviewability).
46 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 802 (citing Lewis, 685 F.2d at 661 n.5)
'7 The special circumstance of Center for Auto Safety that the petitioners had sought
judicial review previously militates against review; to hold otherwise would force courts to
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Chaney PRESUMPTION OF UNREVIEWABILITY
By concluding that NHTSA's regulations provided the court
with a judicially manageable standard, the Center for Auto Safety
court decided to settle the precise issue that the Supreme Court
intentionally left unanswered in Heckler v. Chaney.45 Although
there are some decisions to this effect, most of the authority is in
the context of affirmative agency action, not an agency's decision
not to act.49
It is suggested that there are three possible ways the Chaney
precedent can be viewed to apply in the instant case. The first is
that it is a mere example of APA section 701(a)(2), which is the
view the Center for Auto Safety court seems to have taken. Under
exercise judicial review every time a petitioner claimed to have additional evidence.
"' See 470 U.S. at 836. The Court rejected the argument that an FDA policy statement
attached to an unpromulgated rule could provide the "law to apply" but left "the problem
of whether an agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide courts with ade-
quate guidelines for informed judicial review of decisions not to enforce." Id.
The Chaney court also left unanswered three other situations: (1) where an agency
claims lack of jurisdiction, id. at 833 n.4; (2) where an agency's policy "is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities," id.; and (3) where it is claimed
that constitutional rights are violated, id. at 838. The Chaney holding itself and these unan-
swered questions drew much criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Mikva, The Changing
Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115, 134-40 (1986) (administrative discretion to
refuse enforcement may be limited by unanswered issues); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 665-83
(discussing why there should be no distinction between cases of action and inaction); Com-
ment, Administrative Law: The Creation of a Presumption of Unreviewability in Cases of
Administrative Inaction [Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985)], 25 WASHBURN L.J.
347, 355-56 (1986) (presumption of unreviewability encourages Reagan administration's pol-
icy of deregulation through inaction).
Despite its shortcomings, Chaney is the law and has been widely applied. See, e.g.,
International Union, United Auto. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 244-
45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (decision not to enforce reporting requirements of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act unreviewable); Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907, 910
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Department of Justice's decision not to provide counsel unreviewable),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986); Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (D. Colo.
1985) (applying Chaney to Department of Agriculture's failure to claim federally reserved
water rights).
4' See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) (dismissal of employee inef-
fective because Department of Interior failed to afford procedural rights granted by its regu-
lations); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957) (discharge of Foreign Service Officer
in noncompliance of Regulations of Department of State invalid); California Human Dev.
Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Labor Department's allocation of
funds subject to conformance to its own regulations). But see Sunstein, supra note 1, at 680
(failure to enforce agency regulations not grounds for judicial intervention). The Center for
Auto Safety court added that the Service principle also applied to nonenforcement deci-
sions. See 828 F.2d at 808. It is submitted that the decision to extend the Service principle
to agency inaction completely disregards the four reasons set out in Chaney. See supra note
5 (discussing Chaney rationale).
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this approach, the analysis is the same as the traditional "law to
apply" test because once the Center for Auto Safety court decided
that the agency's regulations provided the "law to apply," the
court's inquiry did not have to proceed any further.50 Here again,
however, the court failed to recognize that the proper standard was
the "reasonable possibility of issuance of the requested order," 1
which left intact the statutory discretion evidenced by the
NHTSA's prior decision not to institute the final determination in
Lewis.52 The second approach, argued by Judge Bork in his dis-
sent, is that although the Chaney court explicitly held that the
presumption of unreviewability was under section 701(a)(2), the
Court distinguished subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) while comment-
ing on the "no law to apply" statement in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc., a case which did not involve an agency's deci-
sion not to act." Furthermore, the fact that the two subsections
have common features under the general presumption of review-
ability and that the Chaney court spoke in general language, led
Judge Bork to argue that the Chaney court intended the presump-
tion of unreviewability to be applied generally to both
subsections."
An alternative approach, it is submitted, is the most logical
and correct interpretation of Chaney. It is suggested that agency
inaction, which is committed to agency discretion, triggered the
Chaney presumption of unreviewability, thus distinguishing
Center for Auto Safety from other affirmative action cases gov-
erned by the normal presumption of reviewability and requiring a
test other than the traditional "law to apply" test. The Center for
Auto Safety court recognized that a different test was required but
disposed of the issue by concluding that the agency's own regula-
tions sufficiently rebutted Chaney.55 The Chaney court provided
that the means to overcome the presumption could be derived
50 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 803.
See 49 C.F.R. § 552.8 (1987); see also supra note 41.
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
53 See Center for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 819-20 (Bork, J., dissenting).
See id. (Bork, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 803. The court considered the first rationale of Chaney and concluded that
the "'reasonable possibility' of a safety-related defect" standard ruled out the resources
factors. See id. This conclusion is contrary to past NHTSA policy and actions as evidenced
by Lewis and the Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. See id. at 804-09. Additionally, the court did not consider other
Chaney concerns.
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from the substantive statute and any congressional limitation of
the agency's exercise of enforcement power, which necessarily in-
volves a determination of congressional intent.86 Therefore, if the
underlying statute grants broad discretion without providing the
"law to apply," and the agency decides not to open an enforcement
investigation, the court must construe the statute to determine
whether the presumption of unreviewability is rebutted.5 7 In
Center for Auto Safety, there was ample statutory evidence that
the Act favored preclusion of review; thus, the Chaney presump-
tion was not rebutted, but rather, strengthened. 8
It may seem that the second and the last approach amount to
the same result. It is suggested, however, that the crucial distinc-
tion is that the latter approach does not apply the Chaney pre-
sumption to all agency inaction, but only to those decisions which
are committed to an agency's discretion within the meaning of sec-
tion 701(a)(2). Then, and only then, will the Chaney presumption
operate and then the court must examine the congressional intent
to determine whether the presumption is sufficiently overcome.
CONCLUSION
To conclude that the court had authority to review the
NHTSA's decision not to investigate, the Center for Auto Safety
court relied on the NHTSA's own regulations to provide the "law
to apply" and on a statutory construction that failed to consider all
the necessary elements. In special circumstances of agency inaction
committed to agency discretion, the Chaney presumption should
not be rebutted by mere presence of the "law to apply" in the
agency's regulations. Under the circumstances, courts should ex-
amine the intent of Congress, embodied in the statute under which
56 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). The Court also stated that "[iln
so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to
whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable." Id. at
838.
" See id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan emphasized the need for
contrary congressional intent to defeat the presumption of unreviewability by concluding:
"Individual, isolated nonenforcement decisions, however, must be made by hundreds of
agencies each day. It is entirely permissible to presume that Congress has not intended
courts to review such mundane matters, absent ... some indication of congressional intent
to the contrary . .. ." Id.
58 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Act and analyzing its
legislative history).
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the agency operates, when determining the reviewability of an ad-
ministrative agency's decision.
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